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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TWELFTH CIRCUIT
ENVIRONMENTAL DISPOSAL CORP.
Appellant
V.
STATE OF NEW UNION
Appellee
Civ. No. 92-21
CLEANFILL SERVICES, INC.
Appellant
V.
STATE OF NEW UNION
Appellee
JUDGES' BENCH BRIEF
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
Environmental Disposal Corporation and Cleanfill Ser-
vices, Inc., have appealed the decision of the United States
District Court for the District of New Union in their consoli-
dated cases, docketed in that court as Civ. No. 92-538 and 92-
813.
Each party is instructed to brief the following questions:
(1) Is the hazardous waste interstate import ban of
the New Union Hazardous Waste Self-Sufficiency Act
(NUHWSSA) valid? New Union and Cleanfill Services,
Inc. claim that it is; Environmental Disposal Corporation
claims that it is not.
(2) Is the hazardous waste interstate export ban of
the NUHWSSA valid? Environmental Disposal Corpora-
tion claims that it is; Cleanfill Services, Inc. claims that it
is not. New Union claims that the export ban is valid, but
1
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adds that if the import ban is invalid, then the export ban
is invalid also.
Parties are limited in their briefs to the above issues and
positions, but are not limited to reasons advanced for these
positions to only those raised in the court below.For purposes of briefing and argument, federal statutory
law to be considered is that which is law as of September 15,
1992, and nothing beyond the record shall be briefed or ar-
gued regarding the nature of DBCP.
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PROCEDURAL POSTURE OF THE CASE
This case is properly in the federal district court on fed-
eral question jurisdiction. The case comes to the Twelfth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals on appeal from a decision of the lower
court upholding in its entirety the validity of NUHWSSA. All
parties concede venue in the Twelfth Circuit Court of Appeals
is proper under 28 U.S.C. §§ 127, 1391(e) (1988).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant Environmental Disposal Corp. ("EDC") oper-
ates a waste treatment and disposal facility in New Union and
appellant Cleanfill Services, Inc. ("CSI") operates a facility in
North Hampshire. Their operations have been adversely af-
fected by a statute enacted by New Union. The statute is en-
titled the New Union Hazardous Waste Self-Sufficiency Act
("NUHWSSA"). It caused EDC and CSI to initiate separate
actions in the United States District Court for the District of
New Union. Appellants appeal the lower court's decision,
dated April 23, 1992, which upheld the NUHWSSA. These
cases have been consolidated upon appeal to the United
States Court of Appeals for the 12th Circuit.
In February 1991, the state of New Union enacted the
NUHWSSA. The legislature found that hazardous waste is a
threat to human health and environment, and additionally
that hazardous waste originating outside of New Union is
more dangerous than hazardous waste originating inside New
Union. The Act's purpose is to enable New Union to become
self-sufficient in its disposal of hazardous waste generated in-
state. The New Union legislature claims to be acting in accor-
dance with the Congressional policy favoring hazardous waste
self-sufficiency, as expressed in section 104(c)(9) of the Coin-
1993]
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prehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Lia-
bility Act ("CERCLA"), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(9) (1988).
NUHWSSA bans all export and import of hazardous waste for
treatment, storage or disposal in New Union or any other
state as of March 1, 1993.
The following NUHWSSA provisions are relevant to this
appeal:
Section 1. Findings.
(a) The New Union legislature finds that hazardous waste
is a threat to human health and the environment.
(b) The legislature further finds that hazardous waste
originating outside of New Union is more dangerous to
human health and the environment than waste originat-
ing inside New Union.
Section 2. Policy. The New Union legislature seeks
hazardous waste self-sufficiency. The legislature endorses
the United States Congress' policy reflected in section 104
(c) (9) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C.
9604(c)(9), requiring, as a condition of funding under this
federal program, each state to assure capacity for disposal
of its own hazardous waste, either in-state or through an
interstate agreement. No interstate agreement has been
reached with neighboring states.
Section 3. Export Ban. Effective March 1, 1993, no
hazardous waste may be transported from New Union to
any other state.
Section 4. Import Ban. Effective March 1, 1993, no
hazardous waste may be transported from any other state
to New Union, whether for treatment, storage, or disposal
in New Union or any other state.
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Section 5. Title. This Act may be cited as the New
Union Hazardous Waste Self-Sufficiency Act.
During legislative hearings, the chair of the New Union Sen-
ate's Environmental Protection Committee asked the General
Counsel of the New Union Department of Environmental Af-
fairs whether: (1) the state legislature could enact bans on the
export and import of hazardous waste; and (2) if the ban on
imports was struck down by a reviewing court, would the ex-
port ban necessarily be struck down as well. The General
Counsel responded affirmatively to both questions.
The three states of New Union, North Hampshire and
South Hampshire have fourteen hazardous waste treatment
and disposal facilities: ten in New Union, two in North Hamp-
shire and two in South Hampshire. Prior to the enactment of
NUHWSSA, all waste generated in the tri-state area was
treated and disposed of within the region. Appellant EDC op-
erates the Springfield facility in New Union. The Springfield
facility is located on land owned by the state of New Union,
but leased to EDC for a term of ninety-nine years. Under the
terms of the lease, New Union receives 10% of the facility's
annual profits as rent, and EDC capitalizes a closure fund for
the landfill. The placing of the facility on state land and the
terms of the lease are specified pursuant to the New Union
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("NURCRA"), as
enacted in 1977. Appellant CSI operates the Maywood facility
in North Hampshire which is a hazardous waste chemical
treatment facility and landfill.
Half of the hazardous waste generated in New Union is
disposed of in-state, with 1/ at the Springfield facility. NUR-
CRA provides a hazardous waste management program under
state law that is separate from the federal Resource Conserva-
tion and Recovery Act ("RCRA"). New Union has never
sought or received approval to implement RCRA. The Spring-
field facility possesses all the necessary permits from the EPA
under RCRA and from the New Union Department of Envi-
ronmental Affairs. New Union exports the remaining half of
its waste to facilities in North Hampshire and South Hamp-
shire. All of North and South Hampshire's waste is disposed
1993]
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of at the Springfield facility in New Union.
According to the EPA's land ban regulations under
RCRA, waste containing any amount of DBCP must be incin-
erated according to safeguards that are only available at the
EDC facility in New Union. DBCP is a nerve gas-like agent. A
small drop of DBCP absorbed through the skin or inhaled will
cause convulsions within seconds and death within minutes
unless an antidote is applied immediately. In 1990, the New
Union Department of Emergency Response spent approxi-
mately $1.4 million responding to an accident where a truck
carrying two gallons of pure DBCP from North Hampshire to
the EDC Springfield facility overturned in New Union, killing
forty head of cattle and threatening the life of a farmer. Each
significant source of hazardous waste in North Hampshire and
South Hampshire produces waste with traces of DBCP. Addi-
tionally, three factories in North Hampshire and two factories
in South Hampshire produce pure DBCP as waste. After
NUHWSSA is effective, North Hampshire and South Hamp-
shire will no longer be able to dispose of any waste, including
waste containing DBCP, at the EDC Springfield facility. The
hazardous waste produced in the tri-state region is fairly ho-
mogeneous, except for DBCP.
SUMMARY OF THE ISSUES
1. Is the NUHWSSA import ban invalid as a burden on
interstate commerce as protected by the Commerce
Clause of the U.S. Constitution?
2. Is the NUHWSSA export ban invalid as a burden on
interstate commerce as protected by the Commerce
Clause of the U.S. Constitution?
3. Statutory construction issues:
a. Whether the remainder of the NUHWSSA would
survive should a court declare unconstitutional and
[Vol. 10
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void either section 3 (the export ban) or section 4 (the
import ban) of the Act, where no severability clause
exists within the statute?
b. What weight, if any, should be given the legislative
hearing responses of the General Counsel of the New
Union Department of Environmental Affairs as to the
state's ability to enact bans on the import and export
of hazardous waste, as well as the consequences of a
court declaring unconstitutional the import ban on
the statute's remainder?
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
I. VALIDITY OF THE IMPORT BAN
A. Preemption
EDC may move that the federal Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act (RCRA) prohibits New Union from enact-
ing legislation that interferes with the interstate transporta-
tion and disposal of hazardous waste. New Union may counter
this argument by pointing out that RCRA allows the states to
supplement its provisions.
B. Authorization under CERCLA
New Union may move that section 104(c)(9) of the Com-
prehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Lia-
bility Act (CERCLA) authorizes states to erect barriers to the
interstate shipment of hazardous waste in the interest of haz-
ardous waste self-sufficiency. CSI may attempt to counter this
by arguing that section 104(c)(9) does not authorize an inter-
ference with interstate commerce such as the import ban of
NUHWSSA.
C. Dormant Commerce Clause Analysis
EDC may argue that the import ban is facially discrimi-
natory and it should be declared invalid as a burden on inter-
state commerce under the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Con-
1993]
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stitution. The court will use the heightened scrutiny test
where a statute is facially discriminatory. Since facial discrim-
ination is not enough for the court to invalidate the statute,
EDC may continue to argue that the local purpose is not legit-
imate and, even if it is legitimate, there were less discrimina-
tory means available to achieve this purpose. New Union will
argue that the purpose was legitimate and that there were no
less discriminatory alternatives available.
D. Quarantine Cases
EDC may argue that the NUHWSSA import ban is a bur-
den on interstate commerce since all of North and South
Hampshire's waste is disposed of at their facility in New
Union and that there is no other facility available in the re-
gion to dispose of DBCP-laden waste. New Union may argue
that NUHWSSA is a proper exercise of its police power au-
thority and it should not be required to wait until the trans-
port of DBCP-laden hazardous waste causes harm to its resi-
dents or to the environment until it takes action. It may
follow the rationale of "quarantine" cases that dealt with the
transport of noxious articles of commerce.
II. VALIDITY OF THE EXPORT BAN
A. Dormant Commerce Clause Analysis
CSI may argue that the export ban is facially discrimina-
tory and it should be declared invalid as a burden on inter-
state commerce under the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Con-
stitution. The court will use the heightened scrutiny test
where a statute is facially discriminatory. Since facial discrim-
ination is not enough for the court to invalidate the statute
CSI may continue to argue that the local purpose is not legiti-
mate and even if it is legitimate there were less discriminatory
means available to achieve this purpose. New Union will argue
that the purpose was legitimate and that there were no less
discriminatory alternatives available.
[Vol. 10
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol10/iss2/8
BENCH BRIEF
B. Market Participant
New Union may argue that, because it is a "market par-
ticipant," the export ban should not be subjected to tradi-
tional commerce clause analysis. CSI may argue that the mar-
ket participant exemption does not apply to New Union
because the state does not own and control the Springfield
facility.
III. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
A. Severability of the New Union Legislation
Appellee NU may argue that in the absence of a sever-
ability clause a court's determination that the section 4 Im-
port Ban is unconstitutional will cause the section 3 Export
Ban to fail as well. Additionally, Appellee NU may attempt to
argue that this was the intent of the legislature, and that
without Section 4 the entirety cannot be given effect. Appel-
lant EDC may counter that although the section 4 Import
Ban is constitutionally defective, it is severable from the act,
and that the Export Ban and the remainder are unaffected
and can stand on their own as fully operative law. Likewise,
Appellant CSI may pose a similar argument, but submit that
while the section 3 Export Ban is invalid the other statutory
provisions (to include the section 4 Import Ban) remain valid
and can stand alone.
B. Weight and Effect of the General Counsel's Opinion
Appellee NU may argue that the General Counsel's re-
sponses during the legislative hearings are entitled to consid-
erable weight due to their influence and role in the legislative
process, as well as being an interpretation of an agency official
regarding an enabling act that it is charged to administer.
Both Appellant EDC and Appellant CSI may argue that the
statute is clear on its face, and that resorting to the remarks
of an administrative agency personnel is not needed nor
should be given any weight or deference. The appellant may
also proffer that the comments of the General Counsel are un-
reliable and are not indicative of legislative intent.
1993]
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DISCUSSION
This brief discusses the validity of New Union's Hazard-
ous Waste Self Sufficiency Act ("NUHWSSA"). The stated
purpose of NUHWSSA is to enable the state to become self-
sufficient in the disposal of the hazardous waste generated in
the state. The statute contains an import ban, and an export
ban. The import ban will be scrutinized under Commerce
Clause Doctrines. The effect of congressional action on New
Union's ability to legislate in the area of hazardous waste will
also be discussed. Additionally the import ban will be scruti-
nized as a discriminatory action interfering with interstate
commerce. Likewise, the brief will examine how the export
ban may be affected by challenges under Commerce Clause
doctrines, including the market participant doctrine. Next,
statutory construction is examined to ascertain possible sever-
ability of either the import or the export ban should one be
declared unconstitutional. Finally, the weight of the General
Counsel's opinion during drafting will be discussed as to its
effect as an extrinsic source on legislative history.
I. IMPORT BAN
The Founders envisioned a free, unrestricted marketplace
where every farmer, craftsman, etc., could be certain that he
would have free access to every market in the nation and that
his products would not be banned from any state because of
customs, duties, or regulations.1 The Commerce Clause2 pro-
tects this vision. It states that "Congress shall have "[t]he
Power . . . [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign nations, and
among the several states . . . ." "[T]he Commerce Clause re-
sponds principally to state taxes and regulatory measures im-
peding free private trade in the national marketplace."3 The
Supreme Court has found that hazardous waste is an article of
commerce and therefore given Commerce Clause protection.4
1. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 539 (1949).
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
3. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 436-37 (1980).
4. Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 112 S. Ct. 2009, 2013 n.3 (1992).
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A. Commerce Clause
A state can protect the health and safety of its citizens
and the integrity of its natural resources as long as it does not
needlessly obstruct interstate trade or try to economically iso-
late itself.5 The philosophy behind the United States' Consti-
tution is that "the peoples of the several states must sink or
swim together .. . in the long run prosperity and salvation
are in union and not division."' A state cannot isolate itself
from the nation's problems by protecting its own residents'
economic interests by discriminating against out-of-state con-
sumers.7 Economic protectionism is almost always found to be
an illegitimate objective8
By blocking interstate trade through import and export
bans, a state may attempt to isolate itself from the nation's
problems in violation of the Commerce Clause. The disposal
of waste is a major problem for every state in this nation. By
enacting the NUHWSSA, New Union is attempting to create
a plan where it can be self-sufficient in its disposal of hazard-
ous waste." Through this plan, New Union will neither allow
exportation of any waste generated in-state,1" nor accept
waste generated out-of-state. 1" This blockage of interstate
trade will place New Union in economic isolation, regarding
the disposal of hazardous waste.
The Supreme Court has also found that a state cannot
restrict its natural resources for in-state users' 2 because a re-
striction by one state would cause a restriction by another
state until all states had such restrictions causing interstate
5. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 151 (1986).
6. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935).
7. Id. at 527.
8. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978); Minnesota v.
Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 471 (1981); Norfolk S. Corp. v. Oberly, 822
F.2d 388, 401 (3d Cir. 1987).
9. NUHWSSA § 2.
10. NUHWSSA § 3. "EXPORT BAN. Effective March 1, 1993, no hazardous waste
may be transported from New Union to any other state." Id.
11. NUHWSSA § 4. "IMPoRT BAN. Effective March 1, 1993, no hazardous waste
may be transported from any other state to New Union..." Id.
12. West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911); Pennsylvania v. West
Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923).
1993]
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commerce to cease. 13
B. Effect of Congressional Action
Actions taken by Congress under the Commerce Clause
may effect the ability of the states to legislate in a manner
that interferes with interstate commerce. Congress may enact
a statute that preempts action by the states,14 or Congress
may pass legislation that authorizes the states to act in ways
that restrict interstate commerce. 5 At issue here is what ex-
tent Congress has preempted the States from legislating on
the subject of hazardous waste by its enactment of the Re-
source Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA"), e and the
extent Congress has authorized the states, under section
104(c)(9) of CERCLA, 17 to act in the interest of hazardous
waste self-sufficiency as New Union has done."
1. Preemption
The U.S. Constitution provides that "the Laws of the
United States. . .shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and
the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing
in the Constitution of Laws of any State to the Contrary not-
withstanding.' 9 RCRA is a federal statutory scheme estab-
13. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1977); West v. Kansas Nat-
ural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229, 255 (1911) (regulation restricting oil and gas commerce
void; this court uses the dominant approach used by courts which address state regu-
lation of the export of natural resources). See also Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262
U.S. 553 (1923); H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949); Sporhase
v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941 (1982) (permit required for export of
groundwater; facially discriminatory; state failed to show a close fit between a reci-
procity agreement and the asserted local purpose); New England Power Co. v. New
Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331 (1982) (restriction on export of hydroelectric power pro-
duced by a federal facility void); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979) (restric-
tion on export of minnows, licenses and fees required, held void.).
14. See, e.g., Michigan Canners & Freezers Ass'n, Inc. v. Agricultural Mktg. &
Bargaining Bd., 467 U.S. 461, 469 (1984).
15. See, e.g., Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of Governors, 472 U.S. 159, 174-
75 (1985).
16. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-6939b (1988).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(9) (1988).
18. NUHWSSA § 2.
19. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
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lishing uniform and minimum standards for the storage,
transportation and disposal of hazardous waste.20 State law
may be preempted by: (1) Congress enacting a federal law
that expressly preempts state authority, (2) Congress enacting
a pervasive scheme of federal regulation that leaves the states
no room to supplement the scheme, or (3) direct conflict be-
tween state and federal law.2 Even if Congress has not com-
pletely foreclosed state legislation in a particular area, a state
statute is void to the extent that it actually conflicts with a
valid federal statute. A conflict will be found "where compli-
ance with both federal and state regulations is a physical im-
possibility .".2 or where the state "law stands as an obsta-
cle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress. 21 3 Thus, the import ban enacted
under NUHWSSA will be held invalid if: (1) Congress has ex-
pressly preempted all state legislation in the area of hazardous
waste, (2) Congress has enacted a federal scheme that does
not allow for further state legislation in the area of hazardous
waste, or (3) the import ban conflicts with federal law.
RCRA section 3009 provides that states may supplement
its federal regulatory scheme.24 Congress has not expressly
20. See Supra note 16; see H.R. REP. No. 1491, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 29-32
(1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6238, 6267-70.
21. Michigan Canners & Freezers Ass'n, Inc. v. Agricultural Mktg. & Bargaining
Bd., 467 U.S. 461, 469 (1984); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources
Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 203-04 (1983); see DANIEL P. SELMI &
KENNETH A. MANASTER, STATE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 5.04 (1991).
22. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963).
23. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941); Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,
435 U.S. 151, 158 (1978); see SELMI & MANASTER, supra note 21, § 5.04[4].
24. 42 U.S.C. § 6929 (1988). Section 3009 provides that:
[u]pon the effective date of regulations under this subtitle no State or politi-
cal subdivision may impose any requirements less stringent than those au-
thorized under this subtitle respecting the same matter as governed by such
regulations, except that if application of a regulation with respect to any
matter under this subtitle is postponed or enjoined by the action of any
court, no State or political subdivision shall be prohibited from acting with
respect to the same aspect of such matter until such time as such regulation
takes effect. Nothing in this title shall be construed to prohibit any State or
political subdivision thereof from imposing any requirements, including those
for site selection, which are more stringent than those imposed by such regu-
lations. Nothing in this title (or in any regulation adopted under this title)
19931
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preempted state legislation nor has Congress enacted a
scheme that does not allow for supplemental state action. The
issue then is whether New Union's import ban conflicts with
federal law. RCRA provides for the uniform national regula-
tion of hazardous waste, creating minimum requirements for
the storage, treatment and disposal of hazardous wastes. 5
Section 3009 allows a state to supplement RCRA general re-
quirements with specific requirements of local concern.26 The
Environmental Protection Agency's ("EPA") regulations for
state programs approved under RCRA provide that approved
state programs, in order to be consistent with the federal
scheme, cannot unreasonably interfere with interstate com-
merce.17 The New Union hazardous waste management pro-
gram is not approved under RCRA and as an unapproved
state program, is not covered by the EPA's RCRA regulations.
The authority for a state to regulate hazardous waste de-
rives from the state's authority to enact legislation in the in-
terest of the public health, safety and welfare.2 Therefore,
shall be construed to prohibit any State from requiring that the State be
provided with a copy of each manifest used in connection with hazardous
waste which is generated within that State or transported to a treatment,
storage, or disposal facility within that State.
Id. For the EPA regulations interpreting and implementing this section see 40 C.F.R.
§ 271.1(i) (1992).
25. Old Bridge Chem. Inc. v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 965 F.2d
1287, 1292 (3d Cir. 1992).
26. Ogden Envtl. Serv. v. City of San Diego, 687 F. Supp. 1436 (S.D. Cal. 1988)
(reversing the local denial of a conditional use permit for a hazardous waste
incinerator).
27. 40 C.F.R. § 271.4 (1992). The regulation reads as follows:
§ 271.4 Consistency
(a) Any aspect of the State program which unreasonably restricts, impedes,
or operates as a ban on the free movement across the State border of hazard-
ous wastes from or to other States for treatment, storage, or disposal at facili-
ties authorized to operate under the Federal or an approved State program
shall be deemed inconsistent.
(b) Any aspect of State law or of the State program which has no basis in
human health or environmental protection and which acts as a prohibition on
the treatment, storage, or disposal of hazardous waste in the State may be
deemed inconsistent.
Id.
28. Celebreeze v. Environmental Enter., Inc., 559 N.E.2d 1335, 1336 (Ohio 1990);
see Luckie v. Gorsuch, 13 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl: L. Inst.) 20,406-07 (D. Ariz. Feb. 25,
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol10/iss2/8
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NUHWSSA may be seen as a valid exercise of the New
Union's police power.
2. "Authorization" under CERCLA
In section 2 of the NUHWSSA, the New Union legisla-
ture declared that it was acting in accord with the congres-
sional policy favoring hazardous waste self-sufficiency, as ex-
pressed in section 104(c)(9) of CERCLA.2 e Section 104(c)(9)
was added to CERCLA by the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986 ("SARA"). 30 Section 104(c)(9)
provides that:
[e]ffective 3 years after October 17, 1986, the President
shall not provide any remedial actions pursuant to this
section unless the State in which the release occurs first
enters into a contract or cooperative agreement with the
President providing assurances deemed adequate by the
President that the State will assure the availability of
hazardous waste treatment or disposal facilities which -
(A) have adequate capacity for destruction, treat-
ment, or secure disposition of all hazardous wastes
that are reasonably expected to be generated within
the State during the 20-year period following the
date of such contract or cooperative agreement and
to be disposed of, treated, or destroyed,
(B) are within the State or outside the State in ac-
cordance with an interstate agreement or regional
agreement or authority,
(C) are acceptable to the President, and
(D) are in compliance with the requirements of sub-
1983) (this authority is commonly known as a state's police power).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(9) (1988). The section reads as follows:
SECTION 2. POLicy. The New Union legislature seeks hazardous waste self-sufficiency.
The legislature endorses the United States Congress' policy reflected in section
104(c)(9) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liabil-
ity Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(9), requiring, as a condition of funding under
this federal program, each state to assure capacity for disposal of its own hazardous
waste, either in-state or through an interstate agreement. No interstate agreement
has been reached with neighboring states.
NUHWSSA § 2.
30. Pub. L. No. 99-499, § 104, 100 Stat. 1613, 1617-25 (1986).
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title C of the Solid Waste Disposal Act [RCRA, 42
U.S.C. §§ 6921-39b]. 31
Under section 104(c)(9), Congress established a scheme
whereby states would attain hazardous waste self-sufficiency
by October 17, 1989. States unable to show self-sufficiency af-
ter that date are barred from receiving any federal monies
from the Fund established under CERCLA for the cleanup of
spills and other releases of hazardous substances.2
In Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of Governors, the
Supreme Court noted that "[wihen Congress so chooses, state
actions which it plainly authorizes are invulnerable to consti-
tutional attack under the Commerce Clause." 33 However, in a
dispute involving a Nebraska statute that prohibited the ex-
port of its groundwater without a permit, the Court'noted
that even though Congress had deferred to state water law in
37 statutes, there was no "persuasive evidence that Congress
consented to the unilateral imposition of unreasonable bur-
dens on commerce" at issue. 4 If section 104(c)(9) of CERCLA
"plainly authorizes" restrictions on interstate commerce in
the interest of hazardous waste self sufficiency, then New
Union's import ban would be valid. Following the Sporhase
reasoning, New Union's unilateral action in seeking hazardous
waste self-sufficiency through isolation would be seen as creat-
ing an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce when en-
acted without "plain authorization" from Congress.
The Circuit Court of Appeals in interpreting section
104(c)(9) has not found a clear grant of authorization for the
states to erect barriers to interstate commerce. "[N]othing in
SARA evidences congressional authorization for each state to
close its borders to waste generated in other states to meet
31. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(9).
32. H.R. REP. No. 253, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 130 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2912.
33. 472 U.S. 159, 174-75 (1985). At issue in Northeast Bancorp was a system of
regional banking that excluded bank holding companies from outside the Northeast
from doing business in the region. Id. at 162-65. The Court upheld the restriction on
interstate commerce on the basis that Congress had authorized such state actions. Id.
at 174-75.
34. Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 958-60 (1982).
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federally mandated hazardous waste management require-
ments. SARA places the burden of making capacity assurance
for future hazardous waste management on the generating
state and imposes a sanction on that state for failure to sat-
isfy its obligation." 5 The Fourth Circuit found that the lan-
guage of RCRA and section 104(c)(9) of CERCLA does not
indicate "an unmistakably clear congressional intent to permit
states to burden interstate commerce" nor has the State
presented "legislative history from the two statutes that
demonstrate such intent."3 An argument for an implied grant
of authorization under section 104(c)(9) based on Northeast
Bancorp was rejected in Hazardous Waste Treatment Coun-
cil v. South Carolina.3 7
Likewise, the Supreme Court has noted that states may
not impose penalties on conduct already penalized under a
federal statutory scheme. Wisconsin Department of Industry
v. Gould, Inc.3 8 Section 104(c)(9) of CERCLA creates a fed-
eral penalty by denying Fund monies to states not in compli-
ance. 9 The court may view New Union's import ban as a pen-
alty on both North Hampshire and South Hampshire because
those states must now find new means to dispose of their haz-
ardous waste. If New Union's import ban is seen as creating a
penalty under state law, then the import ban is void due to
conflict with and preemption by federal law.
C. Dormant Commerce Clause
Decades ago the Supreme Court recognized that a state
has unquestioned power to protect the health and safety of its
citizens.4 ° However, a state cannot use economic measures to
35. National Solid Waste Management Ass'n v. Alabama Dep't of Envtl. Man-
agement, 910 F.2d 713, 721 (11th Cir. 1990), modified, 924 F.2d 1001 (1990), reh'g en
banc denied, 932 F.2d 979, cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2796 (1991).
36. Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. South Carolina, 945 F.2d 781, 792
(4th Cir. 1991).
37. 766 F. Supp. 431, 439-40 (D.S.C.), modified, 945 F.2d 781 (4th Cir. 1991).
38. 475 U.S. 282, 286 (1986).
39. H.R. REP. No. 253, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 130 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6238, 6267-70.
40. Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 353 (1951).
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protect a local industry if adequate reasonable, non-discrimi-
natory alternatives can be used instead.4 ' Even when a state is
regulating in an area of legitimate local concern, limitations
still exist due to the "dormant commerce clause, 42 which de-
fines the effect of the Commerce Clause on state and local reg-
ulations.4 ' The Commerce Clause is referred to as dormant
when Congress has not expressly used its powers in regulating
in this area.4 4 The state's regulation will be contrasted against
the effect that the regulation has on interstate commerce. A
regulation enacted for legitimate reasons will be found to be
invalid if its effects on local problems are marginal, while the
burden it imposes on interstate commerce is substantial.6
Generally, the key concept in a dormant commerce clause
analysis is to "weigh the state regulatory concerns against the
burden imposed on the course of interstate commerce. 4 6 In
reviewing the import ban enacted by New Union, the court
will consider the State's concern over its disposal of hazardous
waste and also the burden that NUHWSSA imposes on inter-
state commerce.
Courts use three approaches when deciding whether a
statute violates the Commerce Clause: (1) a heightened scru-
tiny approach, (2) a balancing test and (3) a highly deferential
approach. Heightened scrutiny is applied if the statute is
facially discriminatory or is discriminatory in its effects. The
other two approaches are used when a statute is not so obvi-
ously discriminatory. The balancing test compares the stat-
ute's effect on interstate commerce with local benefits.' The
41. Id. at 354.
42. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 471; Hughes v.
Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 326 (1979).
43. Norfolk Southern Corp. v. Oberly, 822 F.2d 388, 390, 399 (3d Cir. 1987).
44. Lisa J. Petricone, The Dormant Commerce Clause: A Sensible Standard of
Review, 27 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 443 n.6 (1987).
45. Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 670 (1981).
46. Direct Auto. Imports Ass'n, Inc. v. Townsley, 804 F.2d 1408, 1416 (5th Cir.
1986) (citing Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 670-71 (1981)).
47. A balancing test is used if a statute is not facially discriminatory so that it
only incidentally burdens interstate commerce. If the burden on interstate commerce
is "clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits" then the statute will be
found to be invalid. Pike v. Bruce Church Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
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highly deferential approach gives great deference to the legis-
lature and is only used in limited circumstances.4" The height-
ened scrutiny and balancing approaches are most commonly
used, and unfortunately no "clear line" indicates which test to
use."' The New Union statute is facially discriminatory since
NUHWSSA sections 3 and 4 expressly prohibit the import or
export of any hazardous waste. Therefore, based upon the dis-
criminatory wording of the statute, the heightened scrutiny is
the most appropriate test for the court to use.
If the court applied the Pike test to the facts of this case it would attempt to find
whether there is a legitimate local purpose, what the burden on interstate commerce
is and then it will balance this local purpose against the burden on interstate com-
merce. The purpose of the NUHWSSA is to protect the residents of the state and the
environment from the dangers of hazardous waste, especially that which originates
outside of New Union since it is more dangerous than waste originating inside New
Union; in addition the state is attempting to become self sufficient in its treatment of
in-state hazardous waste. The import ban does pose a burden on interstate commerce
since New Union has the only facility in the region that is equipped to handle DBCP-
laden waste.
The following are some recent environmental cases that have used a balancing
approach: Old Bridge Chem. Inc. v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 965 F.2d
1287 (3d Cir. 1992) (upholding New Jersey's regulations relating to the recyclable by-
products of hazardous waste); Diamond Waste, Inc. v. Monroe County, Ga., 939 F.2d
941 (11th Cir. 1991) (enjoining a ban on importation of solid waste to a county owned
facility); J. Filiberto Sanitation v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 857 F.2d
913 (3d Cir. 1988) (county regulation requiring most types of solid waste to be depos-
ited only at a specified transfer station upheld); DeVito v. Rhode Island Solid Waste
Management Corp., 770 F. Supp. 775 (D.R.I. 1991) (regulation requiring waste gener-
ated in-state to be disposed of in-state held void); Washington Bldg. & Constr.
Trades Council v. Spellman, 684 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1982) (ban on importation of low-
level radioactive waste held in violation of Commerce Clause). Evergreen Waste Sys.
v. Metropolitan Serv. Dist., 820 F.2d 1482 (9th Cir. 1987) (ban on the importation of
solid waste from outside of a three-county region held to be a valid exercise of police
power).
48. The highly deferential approach is generally used in the area of highway
safety. Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981); see SELMI &
MANASTER, supra note 21, § 5-26. The Court is reluctant to extend this to other ar-
eas. Norfolk Southern Corp. v. Oberly, 822 F.2d 388 (3d Cir. 1987). Many modern
Supreme Court cases using this test find that the presumption of validity fails. SELMI
& MANASTER, supra note 21, at n. 103 (citing Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice,
434 U.S. 429, 442 (1978)).
49. Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 112 S. Ct. 2009, n.5 (1992).
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1. Heightened Scrutiny
Even though a statute affirmatively discriminates against
interstate transactions, either on its face or in its practical ef-
fect, it is not automatically invalidated. If the statute can be
considered part of the State's police powers, the burden shifts
to the state to prove that the statute serves a legitimate local
purpose and that less discriminatory means were not availa-
ble.50 The availability of nondiscriminatory means to serve the
intended purpose can only be determined through an exten-
sive factual analysis.5 1 The statute will be held valid if the
state meets this heavy burden.52
Recent environmental cases have used the heightened
scrutiny approach. 53 In each case the Supreme Court found
the statute discriminatory but went on to consider each state's
local purpose and whether less discriminatory means were
available. The statute was upheld in one case and invalidated
in the other, proving that facially discriminatory statutes are
not always struck down. 4 A state regulation discriminating
against interstate commerce may be found to be constitu-
tional if: (1) the statute serves a legitimate local purpose, and
(2) it is not possible to serve the purpose equally well by an
50. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986); Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc.,
447 U.S. 27, 36 (1980).
51. See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. at 141-43.
52. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979); Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel.
Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 957 (1982); Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n,
432 U.S. 333, 353 (1977) (outright ban of apples sold in closed containers must be
identified by federal grade or designated ungraded; alleged purpose was to protect
consumers from fraud but less discriminatory alternatives were available); Dean Milk
Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951) (municipal ordinance forbidding the
sale of milk in the city as pasteurized unless it was processed within 5 miles of the
city; alleged purpose was protection of the public's health and safety by the sanitary
regulation of milk).
53. See also National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n v. Alabama Dept. of
Envtl. Management, 910 F.2d 713 (11th Cir. 1990), modified, 924 F.2d 1001 (11th
Cir.), cert. denied 111 S. Ct. 2796 (1991) (prohibited "in-state treatment facilities
from accepting hazardous waste generated in any state that prohibits treatment of
such waste within that state"); Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Templet, 967
F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1992) (ban on hazardous waste from Mexico because they have
less stringent controls).
54. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986); Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v.
Hunt, 112 S. Ct. 2009 (1992).
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available nondiscriminatory means.15
In Chemical Waste Management v. Hunt, the statute at
issue was reviewed under heightened scrutiny and found to be
invalid. The statue imposed a fee on out-of-state hazardous
waste which was to be landfilled in-state.56 The state argued
that the purpose of the additional fee was to protect the
health and safety of its citizens. The Court found the statute
void because there was no evidence that the waste generated
outside of the state was more dangerous than waste generated
inside the state, and that the waste's origin was the only basis
for the additional fee. The Supreme Court listed alternatives
that it deemed acceptable to the fee that Alabama imposed on
foreign hazardous waste disposed of in-state. 57 These alterna-
tives included: (1) a per-mile additional fee on all vehicles
transporting hazardous waste over Alabama roads, (2) a per-
ton additional fee on all hazardous waste disposed of in Ala-
bama and (3) an "even-handed cap" on all waste disposed of
at the facility in question. 5 The Court emphasized the non-
discriminatory nature of each of these alternatives. 9 All of
these alternatives would affect in-state and out-of-state citi-
zens equally.60 The majority held that the imposition of an
additional fee only on hazardous waste imported into the
state and no similar fee imposed on in-state waste was
unconstitutional.6 1
55. New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988); Maine v.
Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 140 (1986); Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941,
958 (1982); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336-37 (1979); Dean Milk Co. v. City
of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951).
56. Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 112 S. Ct. 2009 (1992).
57. Id. at 2015.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. The dissent points out that under these other alternatives state residents
would be faced with additional taxes, since residents already pay general taxes that
go toward the landfill. Id. at 2017.
61. In Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Re-
sources, 112 S. Ct. 2019 (1992), the Supreme Court again stated that "there is, how-
ever, no valid health and safety reason for limiting the amount of waste that a landfill
operator may accept from outside the State, but not the amount that the operator
may accept from inside the State." Id. at 2027.
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In Maine v. Taylor,62 the Court found that an import ban
on live baitfish was constitutional.6 3 The statute was facially
discriminatory, but the court reviewed its purpose and the
availability of less discriminatory means. Previously, the Dis-
trict Court had found that Maine had a legitimate and sub-
stantial purpose in prohibiting this importation of live fish,
due to the uncertain affect of parasites in the fish and of the
non-native fish on the environment. Additionally, it found
that less discriminatory means were not currently available,
and that there was a substantial delay in producing new test-
ing procedures. The First Circuit noted that "several factors
'cast doubt' on the district court's finding of a legitimate local
purpose. '"64 These factors included: (1) the fact that Maine
was the only state in the nation which banned the importation
of live fish, (2) that parasites and other non-native fish could
be brought into the state by other methods that did not fall
under this statute, and (3) that Maine had a method to in-
spect other freshwater fish that it imported. The Supreme
Court rejected the Court of Appeal's rationale and agreed
with the district court. The Supreme Court based its conclu-
sion on the fact that other nondiscriminatory alternatives
were not available; the abstract possibility that a testing pro-
cedure could be developed did not indicate that nondiscrimi-
natory alternatives were available. The state was not required
to develop "new and unproven means of protection at an un-
certain cost," nor wait until environmental damage occurs
before taking action to protect its environment.6 5 The district
court found that Maine's ban on the importation of baitfish
served a legitimate local purpose, which could not possibly be
served as well by available nondiscriminatory means. 6 Ac-
cording to the Court in Maine v. Taylor, a state must show
that "the discrimination is demonstrably justified by a valid
factor unrelated to economic protectionism. "67 The object of
62. 477 U.S. 131 (1986).
63. Id. at 143.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 147-48.
66. Id. at 143.
67. Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 789, 800 (1992).
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the discrimination should pose a "unique threat" which the
state desires to avoid. 8 The Sixth Circuit has noted that "a
state's justification for regulating the influx of potentially haz-
ardous waste and preserving its natural resources is a material
issue of fact under the Commerce Clause." 69
NUHWSSA should be subjected to heightened scrutiny
because the statute is discriminatory on its face since it di-
rectly discriminates against the import and export of hazard-
ous waste. This barrier to interstate trade is not allowed by
the Commerce Clause, so the burden shifts to New Union to
prove that this statute serves a legitimate local purpose and
that less discriminatory means are not available.
NUHWSSA's import ban may be seen as serving a legiti-
mate local purpose because the DBCP present in the waste
imported from North Hampshire and South Hampshire poses
a "unique threat" to the public health, safety and welfare of
New Union, particularly the waste that is pure DBCP. It ap-
pears that nondiscriminatory alternatives are available, in
particular, either the per-mile or the per-ton additional fee al-
ternative described by the Supreme Court in Chemical Waste
Management would serve New Union's purpose. 70 However,
neither of these alternatives would address the specific and
unique threat posed by DBCP. Relying on the fact that DBCP
is such an unusual waste, New Union could have drafted dra-
conian regulations to ensure that if DBCP was carried into
New Union, it would be transported safely.7' Thus, NUHW-
SSA's import ban may be held invalid if the court determines
that nondiscriminatory alternatives are available.
68. Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 112 S. Ct. 2009, 2017 (1992); see
also Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. at 140-43. Last term, the Supreme Court noted that
"[tihere is ... no valid health and safety reason for limiting the amount of waste that
a landfill operator may accept from outside the state, but not the amount the opera-
tor may accept from inside the state." Fort Gratiot Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of
Natural Resources, 112 S. Ct. 2019, 2027 (1992).
69. National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n v. Voinovich, 959 F.2d 590, 593
(6th Cir. 1992).
70. Id.
71. See RCRA § 3009, 42 U.S.C. § 6929 (1988), preserving the States' authority
to supplement the federal scheme for the storage, transportation and disposal of haz-
ardous waste.
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2. Quarantine Cases
In some environmental cases, parties have tried to use ar-
guments posed in the "quarantine cases" where facially overt
discrimination was sustained if out-of-state goods threatened
the safety of the state's citizens or its natural resources.7 1 In
these cases the "outright prohibition of entry rather than
some intermediate form of regulation is the only effective
method of protection. 7 3 Two Supreme Court cases in which
these "quarantine" arguments have been used are: Philadel-
phia v. New Jersey"' and Chemical Waste Management v.
Hunt.75
In Philadelphia v. New Jersey, the court found that the
ban on the importation of waste generated out-of-state was
invalid. z The Supreme Court rejected the argument that the
statute was analogous to quarantine laws. It distinguished dis-
eased animals from solid waste, since solid waste was only
harmful after it was disposed of in a landfill and at that point
there was no reason to distinguish between in-state and out-
of-state waste since one is as harmful as the other.77 There
was no claim that the movement of waste into or through New
Jersey endangered health. The majority found that quaran-
tine laws were bans on the
importation of articles such as diseased livestock that re-
quired destruction as soon as possible because their very
movement risked contagion and other evils. Those laws
thus did not discriminate against interstate commerce as
such, but simply prevented traffic in noxious articles,
72. Clasen v. Indiana, 306 U.S. 439 (1939); Oregon-Washington R.R. & Naviga-
tion Co. v. Washington, 270 U.S. 87 (1926); Asbell v. Kansas, 209 U.S. 251 (1908);
Reid v. Colorado, 187 U.S. 137 (1902); Bowman v. Chicago, 125 U.S. 465 (1888).
73. Lewis v. B.T. Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 43 (1980) (court held that
some intermediate type of regulation of bank holding companies could be enacted
instead of an outright prohibition).
74. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 629 (1978).
75. Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 112 S. Ct. 2009, 2016 (1992).
76. 437 U.S. 617, 629.
77. Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources,
112 S. Ct. 2019, 2027 (1992); Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986).
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whatever their origin."
New Jersey could not try to conserve its landfills by burden-
ing out-of-state residents only. In his dissent, Justice Rehn-
quist stated that he would have analogized this case to the
quarantine cases. He argued that solid waste cannot be distin-
guished from germ infected rags, diseased meat, etc., and that
the transportation of hazardous waste through a state may
pose health hazards. 9
In Chemical Waste Management v. Hunt,80 the Court re-
peats the proposition that if an article of commerce poses
health concerns, those concerns will not vary with the origin
of the waste - in-state waste can be just as harmful as out-
of-state waste." The Court states that its holding would be
different if the imported waste raised health concerns not
presented by in-state waste.
In various environmental cases statutes have been held
unconstitutional because the court found no difference be-
tween in-state and out-of-state waste. The out-of-state waste
that is imported into New Union is much more dangerous
than in-state waste so the court may find New Union's ban on
the waste valid. Citing Maine v. Taylor, New Union can assert
that it should not have to wait until environmental damage
occurs before taking action. DBCP is very dangerous, and the
ban on the import of out-of-state waste (the majority of which
is laden with DBCP) is a means of protecting its citizens from
accidents which may occur in the transport of DBCP and also
from the possible harmful effects that the treated waste may
have after it is disposed in a New Union landfill. Arguments
used from the quarantine cases might be successfully used in
this case since the transport of this waste creates great risks 2
78. 437 U.S. at 628-29.
79. Id. at 632. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
80. Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 112 S. Ct. 2009 (1992).
81. Id. at 2010; Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural
Resources, 112 S. Ct. 2019 (1992); City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617
(1978); Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986).
82. A truck carrying a two gallon container of pure DBCP from North Hamp-
shire into New Union for disposal overturned. Forty cows died from the escaping
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as did the articles transported in quarantine cases.
Other constitutional clauses may have significant impact
on environmental regulation but they have not yet been
widely tested in the courts. Therefore, even if Congress allows
a state to regulate in a certain area, and even if the statute
would probably be held valid under the Commerce Clause, it
is important to be aware that it still might fail under the
equal protection, contract and the privileges and immunities
clauses of the United States' Constitution.3
II. EXPORT BAN
Section 3 of the NUHWSSA prohibits the export of haz-
ardous waste from New Union. 4 Many of the Commerce
Clause doctrines previously discussed under the import ban
also apply to the export ban. The Supreme Court has noted
that states may not "advance their own commercial interests
by curtailing the movement of articles of commerce, either
into or out of the state." 5
A. Heightened Scrutiny
Like the import ban, the export ban will be subjected to
heightened scrutiny because it is facially discriminatory. 6
Similarly, for the export ban to be upheld, New Union must
show that the statute serves a legitimate local purpose and
that it is not possible to serve the purpose as well by available
nondiscriminatory means. 7
vapors and a farmer was exposed and would have died if the truck driver had not
donned protective clothing and administered an antidote that he had in his truck.
New Union spent approximately $1,400,000 responding to this accident and is still
waiting for reimbursement from North Hampshire and private firms. New Union has
filed an action under CERCLA to recover its response costs.
83. United Building & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S.
208, 220 (1984); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (1985).
84. The section reads as follows: "SECTION 3. EXPORT BAN. Effective March 1,
1993, no hazardous waste may be transported from New Union to any other state."
NUHWSSA § 3.
85. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 535 (1949).
86. See, e.g., Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336-37 (1979).
87. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 140 (1986). Environmental cases addressing
restrictions on the export of solid waste have upheld such restrictions where there has
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The New Union legislature offered no purpose for the ex-
port ban beyond the general policy of hazardous waste self-
sufficiency.8 Nondiscriminatory alternatives to the export ban
might include efforts to increase the capacity of hazardous fa-
cilities in New Union.
B. Market Participant
In Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap, the Supreme Court rec-
ognized that in the absence of congressional action, nothing in
the Commerce Clause prohibits a State "from participating in
the market and exercising the right to favor its own citizens
over others." '89 At issue in Alexandria Scrap was a subsidy of-
fered by the State of Maryland to scrap dealers who processed
worn out or abandoned cars.90 To collect the bounty offered
by the State, a Maryland processor needed only to show an
indemnity agreement provided by the person who delivered
the car to the dealer. Non-Maryland dealers were required to
show one of four documents establishing legal title to a car.9 1
The Court found that Maryland had elected to enter the mar-
ket. It paid state funds for the removal of automobile "hulks,"
rather than engaging in regulatory activity. It had become a
market participant and had not acted in violation of the Com-
merce Clause.92
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have strengthened
and clarified the market participant exception.9 3 The Court
been "an important state health and environmental concern, which does not appear
to materially favor in-state economic interests, but which may have some incidental
impact on commerce between the states." Harvey & Harvey, Inc. v. Delaware Solid
Waste Auth., 600 F. Supp. 1369, 1380 (D. Del. 1985); see J. Filiberto Sanitation v.
New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 857 F.2d 913 (3d Cir. 1988); but see Waste
Sys. Corp. v. County of Martin, Minn., 784 F. Supp. 641 (D. Minn. 1992) (striking
down as an impermissible discrimination against interstate commerce a requirement
that all compostable solid waste be delivered to the local waste facility).
88. NUHWSSA, § 2.
89. 426 U.S. 794, 810 (1976).
90. Id. at 796-802.
91. Id. at 800-01.
92. Id. at 809-10.
93. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980) (South Dakota's preference on sale
of cement to state residents); White v. Massachusetts Council of Const. Employers,
460 U.S. 204 (1983) (Boston's requirement that city financed construction projects
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has applied the market participant exception where a State
was acting as a proprietor or spending its funds directly.9 4
Other courts have held that reserving space in publicly-owned
landfills for residents is within the market participant excep-
tion. 5 The Supreme Court has also held that the exception is
limited to markets in which a state is participating in
directly.96
Here, the question exists whether the market participant
exception applies to New Union because its state hazardous
waste management statute requires, amongst other things,
that all hazardous waste facilities be located on state land. As
it relates to the management of a proprietary resource, the ex-
port ban would be valid if New Union operated the facility
directly.9 7 However, because the land is under a 99-year lease
by which New Union receives only 10% of the net-profits as
annual rent, New Union may not necessarily qualify as a mar-
ket participant. Also, because New Union has such a de
minimis interest in the profits of the Springfield facility, the
export ban may be seen as an impermissible "downstream
regulation."9 8
had to be performed by workers at least half of whom were bona fide city residents);
South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984) (invalidating Alaska
requirement that timber cut from state lands be processed in-state; the Court found
this to be an impermissible attempt at "downstream regulation"); see also City of
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 627-28 n.6 (1978).
94. Alexandria Scrap, 426 U.S. at 809-10; White, 460 U.S. at 209-10.
95. County Comm'r of Charles County v. Stevens, 473 A.2d 12 (Md. 1984); Swin
Resource Systems, Inc. v. Lycoming County, 883 F.2d 245 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
110 S. Ct. 1127 (1990); LeFrancois v. Rhode Island, 669 F. Supp. 1204 (D.R.I. 1987);
Shayne Bros., Inc. v. District of Columbia, 592 F. Supp. 1128 (D.D.C. 1984); see
Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 112 S. Ct. 2009, 2019 (1992) (Rehnquist,
C.J., dissenting).
96. South-Central Timber Dev., 467 U.S. at 98-99.
97. County Comm'r of Charles County v. Stevens, 473 A.2d 12 (Md. 1984); Swin
Resource Systems, Inc. v. Lycoming County, 883 F.2d 245 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
110 S. Ct. 1127 (1990); LeFrancois v. Rhode Island, 669 F. Supp. 1204 (D.R.I. 1987);
Shayne Bros., Inc. v. District of Columbia, 592 F. Supp. 1128 (D.D.C. 1984); see
Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 112 S. Ct. 2009, 2019 (1992) (Rehnquist,
C.J., dissenting).
98. South-Central Timber Dev., 467 U.S. at 98-99.
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III. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
A. Severability and the New Union Legislation
In February 1991, New Union enacted the New Union
Hazardous Waste Self-Sufficiency Act (NUHWSSA). The
statute contains five major sections. The first section explains
the legislature's findings, describing hazardous waste as a
threat to human health and the environment. It also indicates
that hazardous waste produced out-of-state is more dangerous
than that produced in the state. The second section deals with
the legislature's policy, which is to further self-sufficiency and
compliance with CERCLA.99 The third and fourth sections ex-
plicitly deal with export and import bans. The final section
provides the Act's title. The Act contains no severability
clause. A severability clause, if present, would provide that
the entire act would not fail because a portion or portions of
the Act are deemed invalid.
The Appellee may attempt to argue that due to the ab-
sence of a severability clause the unconstitutionality of one
provision may cause the entire act to fall. On the other hand
when a provision is determined unconstitutional and is sever-
able from the act, the Appellants may argue that the remain-
der is unaffected and will stand on its own as fully operative
law. Determining the correct outcome will involve an exami-
nation of statutory construction, as well as legislative history
and intent.
1. Lack of a Severability Clause
A common question pertaining to statutory interpretation
relates to the effect on an act when one of its provisions has
been declared unconstitutional. During the 1980s, the United
States Supreme Court answered this question authorita-
tively. 00 In the Regan v. Time, Inc. case, the Court stated:
99. NUHWSSA § 2. See also Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation, and Liability Act § 104(c)(9), 42 U.S.C. § 9604,(c)(9) (1988).
100. Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641 (1983); Immigration & Naturalization
Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1982).
19931
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In exercising its power to review the constitutionality of a
legislative Act, a federal court should act cautiously. A
ruling of unconstitutionality frustrates the intent of the
elected representatives of the people. Therefore, a court
should refrain from invalidating more of the statute than
is necessary. As this court has observed, "whenever an act
of Congress contains unobjectionable provisions separable
from those found to be unconstitutional, it is the duty of
this court to so declare, and to maintain the act so far as
it is valid." El Paso & Northeastern Ry. Co. v. Gutierrez,
215 U.S. 87, 96 (1909). Thus, this court has upheld the
constitutionality of some provisions of a statute even
though other provisions of the same statute were uncon-
stitutional. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 108 (1976) . ..
we have often refused to resolve the constitutionality of a
particular provision when the constitutionality of a sepa-
rate, controlling provision has been upheld.' 0'
The Regan court believed several controlling factors existed in
the determination of severability. Initially, it determined that
a court must ascertain whether the remaining provisions could
survive in the absence of the unconstitutional provision. 0 It
then proffered that severability of an unconstitutional provi-
sion was "largely a question of legislative intent, but the pre-
sumption is in favor of severability." 103 The court summa-
rized that "[u]nless it is evident that the legislature would not
have enacted those provisions which are within its power, in-
dependently of that which is not, the invalid part may be
dropped if what is left is fully operative as a law. "104
101. Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. at 652-53. See also Brockett v. Spokane Ar-
cades, Inc., 479 U.S. 491 (1985) (a later Supreme Court case stating that severability
can be granted where the parts are wholly independent of one another and where the
constitutional part can stand where the unconstitutional part falls); Alaska Airlines,
Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684-87 (1986) (citing Regan v. Time, Inc., and stating that
in the absence of strong evidence indicative of legislative intent to the contrary, the
objectionable portion of a statute can be excised from the remainder); New York v.
United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992).
102. Regan, 468 U.S. at 653.
103. Id.
104. Id.; See also Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. at 684 (stating that the
standard for severability is whether the legislature would have enacted the provisions
within its power independently from those which it could not); New York v. United
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The Regan v. Time, Inc. decision's reasoning closely fol-
lowed that of another case in the same time period. The Im-
migration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha case specifi-
cally dealt with a statutory clause providing for a one-house
legislative veto in Congress. The court noted its own recent
activity in the area which reaffirmed earlier case law that held
that provisions should be severed unless it is evident that the
legislature would not have enacted the legislation absent the
unconstitutional provision. 1°5 In the challenged statute, a sev-
erability clause was present and the Chadha court noted that
its presence gave rise to a presumption that Congress did not
intend the validity of an act to depend on whether all its parts
are valid.'06 The court added that "[a] provision is further
presumed severable if what remains after 'is fully operative as
a law'. '10 7
Both the Regan and Chadha decisions reflect a growth in
judicial interpretations on this topic. As early as 1880, the Su-
preme Court stated that unconstitutional parts of legislation
can be severed where after removing the offending part(s): (1)
the object of the law is not destroyed, (2) the remainder can
stand alone, and (3) the whole is not invalidated by a single
unconstitutional part. 0 8 Another Supreme Court decision
proffered that "if an obnoxious section is of such import that
other sections without it would cause results not contem-
States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2434 (following the Regan and Alaska Airlines rationale).
105. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 932 (citing
Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corporation Comm'n of Okla., 268 U.S. 210, 234 (1932)).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 934 (quoting Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corporation Comm'n of Okla., 286
U.S. at 234).
108. Tiernan v. Rinker, 102 U.S. 123 (1880). See also Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U.S.
286 (1923) (echoing the same thoughts as did the Tiernan court forty years earlier);
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 684, reh'g denied, 404 U.S. 874 (1971) (the pri-
mary emphasis is to save and not destroy legislation). State courts of that period and
later have also adhered to the same concepts. See, e.g., Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v.
Jones, 37 N.E. 247 (Ill. 1894), error dismissed, 41 L. Ed. 1184 (1896); Newton v. City
of Tuscaloosa, 36 So. 2d 487 (Ala. 1903); State v. Robb, 60 A. 874 (Me. 1905); Lee v.
Smith, 198 So. 296 (Miss. 1940); Oglesby v. Pacific Fin. Corp. of Cal., 38 P.2d 646
(Ariz. 1934); Castle v. Gladden, 270 P.2d 682 (Or. 1954); City of Saint Paul v. Dalsin,
71 N.W.2d 855 (Minn. 1955); State v. Green, 355 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 1979) (enumerating
five indicia needed for severability).
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plated or desired by the legislature, the entire statute must be
held inoperative.' ' 109 These two concepts provided the founda-
tion for another Supreme Court decision which held that
words could not be added after severing an unconstitutional
provision in order to enable remaining provisions to become
effective.110 Emerging from these decisions, the Supreme
Court felt that it was "the duty of the court to sever and
maintain the constitutionality of the remaining provisions." '
Several state and federal courts have attempted to de-
velop tests or conditions on which to base severability. The
Eighth Circuit said that in order to grant severability, two
"indispensable conditions" must be met: (1) the constitutional
and unconstitutional provisions are capable of being sepa-
rated; and (2) the unconstitutional part is not so connected
with the general scope of the law as to make it impossible, if
stricken out, to give effect to the intent of the legislature.1 2
The Ohio Supreme Court stated that a "definite" test existed
which it described as:
whether the parts are so mutually connected with and de-
pendent on each other, and each is such a consideration
or compensation for the other as to make it probable that
if both could not be made effective, the legislature would
not have passed the other. There can be no interdepen-
dence of the provisions on each other in the statute."'
Other courts have avoided the formulation of tests and based
their decisions on the existence of presumptions and legisla-
tive intent. In determining legislative intent, the Louisiana
Supreme Court proffered that where a court is doubtful as to
the intent of the legislature regarding severability, the whole
109. Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U.S. 540, 565 (1902).
110. Butts v. Merchants Trans. Co., 230 U.S. 126, 134 (1912). Contra Springfield
Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of Springfield, 126 N.E. 739, 745 (Ill. 1920) (holding that
"words in a statute may be modified, altered, or supplied so as to obviate any repug-
nance or inconsistency with legislative intention, although in doing so particular pro-
visions of an act may not be read or construed according to their literal reading").
111. El Paso & Northeastern Ry. Co. v. Gutierrez, 215 U.S. at 97.
112. Celia Comm'n Co. v. Bohlinger, 147 F. 419, 423 (8th Cir. 1906).
113. State v. Kassay, 184 N.E. 521, 523 (Ohio 1932).
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statute must fail.1 4 As can be seen, the recurring themes of
the various courts emerge in the Supreme Court's Regan
articulation.
2. Presence of a Severability Clause
When a severability clause is present, a slightly different
analysis emerges. A leading casebook on the legislative process
states that the "severability clause seeks to preserve other
provisions of the proposed legislation if other provisions are
invalidated."' 15 In the late 1920s, the Supreme Court ex-
plained that a presumption exists that the legislature intends
an act to stand in its entirety, or not at all."' It added that a
severability clause operates to overcome this presumption act-
ing as an indicator of the legislature's intent that the act be
divisible, and after the removal of invalid portions, the legisla-
ture would be content with what remains." 7 Other Supreme
Court cases have also avowed this line of thought." 8 Later Su-
preme Court decisions developed this concept further, and
provided significant, detailed explanations of it. In 1931, the
court ventured that:
While this declaration [severability clause] is but an aid
to interpretation and not an inexorable command, (cita-
tion omitted) it has the effect of reversing the common
law presumption, that the legislature intends the act to be
effective as an entirety, by putting in its place the oppo-
site presumption of divisibility ..."'
The case of Carter v. Carter Coal Co. took these concepts
even further by offering that when a severability clause is pre-
sent, two rules come into play. 2 ' First, that without the sever-
114. City of Gretna v. Bailey, 75 So. 491 (La. 1917).
115. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LEGISLATION 836 (1988).
116. Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235, 241 (1928).
117. Id. at 242.
118. See, e.g., Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corporations Comm'n of Okla., 286 U.S. 210
(1931).
119. Utah Power & L. Co. v. Pfost, 286 U.S. 165, 184 (1931).
120. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 312 (1935).
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ability clause, the burden of proof is upon the supporter of
the legislation to show the severability of the provisions in-
volved. 1 The second rule, however, provides that when a sev-
erability clause is present the burden of proof is shifted to the
assailant to show its inseparability.'22 A subsequent decision
directed that when Congress places in legislation the pre-
sumption of divisibility in the form of a severability clause,
the courts should keep in mind that "when validity is in ques-
tion, divisibility and not integration is the guiding principle.
Invalid parts are to be excised and the remainder enforced.
When we are seeking to ascertain the congressional purpose,
we must give heed to this explicit declaration."'2 3
Later federal decisions have also continued along these
same lines. In 1986, the Supreme Court again spoke of statu-
tory interpretation and severability clauses in Alaska Airlines
v. Brock. 24 The Court in Alaska Airlines echoed the interpre-
tations of previous courts that a severability clause created a
presumption that Congress did not intend the validity of the
statute to rest on the constitutionality of a provision within
it.' 2 ' It stated that in the "absence of a severability clause,
however, Congress' silence is just that - silence - and doesn't
raise a presumption against severability."' 26 However, the
court added the caveat that "Congress could not have in-
tended a constitutionally flawed provision [to be severed]
from the remainder of the statute if the balance of the legisla-
tion is incapable of functioning independently.' 2 7
Other federal courts have also provided valuable insight
into this issue. The federal district court in New Hampshire
offered that the effect of a "savings [severability] clause is
merely to reverse the common law presumption that the legis-
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Electric Bond Co. v. Securities & Exchange Comm'n, 303 U.S. 419, 434
(1938).
124. 480 U.S. 678 (1987).
125. Id. at 686. See also Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 789 (1992).
126. Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 686.
127. Id. at 684.
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lature intends the act to be effective as a whole." 12 8 It added
that absence of a severability clause means the common law
presumption exists, but is not conclusive since severability
will depend on the intent of the legislature."19 A Federal Court
of Appeals decision stated that "the ultimate determination of
severability will rarely turn on the presence or absence of such
a [severability] clause."130 It directed that "the court must in-
quire into whether Congress would have enacted the remain-
der ... in absence of the invalid provision."' 3' Concluding,
the court said, with regards to interpretation, "[c]ongressional
intent and purpose are best determined by analysis of the lan-
guage of the statute in question."'' 32
In deciding New Jersey law, the Third Circuit, likewise
arrived at an interesting result in a case dealing with a state
statute regulating the disposal of solid and hazardous waste.1 33
The statute disqualified individuals from licensing if they en-
gaged in criminal or anti-social behavior. It also required in-
formation disclosures. The plaintiff trade group alleged that
sections of the statute were unconstitutional. This caused the
court to discuss the severability issue. The court held that
"[s]everability is, with limited exceptions, an issue of state
law.' 34 It added that "[u]nder New Jersey law the question of
severability of a statute is one of legislative intent" and the
''presence or absence of a severability clause in a statute is not
dispositive. ' '' 31 The court indicated that one must look to such
items as the state's statutes of general application. Within
New Jersey, it found a general statutory provision for enforc-
ing severability.' 3 The court instructed that a case by case
128. Coe v. Reynolds, 592 F. Supp. 488, 490 (D.N.H. 1982).
129. Id. at 491.
130. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Hernando Bank, Inc., 724 F.2d
1188, 1190 (5th Cir. 1984) (citing U.S. v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 585 n.27 (1968)).
131. Id. See also National Advertising Co. v. Town of Niagara, 942 F.2d 145, 148
(2d Cir. 1991) (proffering that the focus remains whether the legislature would have
wanted severability or total rejection of the act).
132. 724 F.2d at 1190.
133. Trade Waste Management Ass'n v. Hughey, 780 F.2d 221 (3d Cir. 1985).
134. Id. at 231 (citing Fox Film Corp. v. Miller, 296 U.S. 207 (1935)).
135. Id.
136. Id.
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analysis would be required in order to determine if a statutory
provision which is invalid would cause the remainder to fail.
Within the analysis, it must be ascertained whether the legis-'
lature would have enacted the remaining parts."3 7 Finally, the
court stated that the "presumption is that severability was in-
tended so long as [the] objectionable features can be excised
without substantial impairment of the principal legislative ob-
jective."1 38 The concepts raised in this decision and those
above have also been examined in depth by several state su-
preme courts. 139
Regardless of whether a severability clause is present, a
number of courts have held that severability is a matter of
state law. 14 0 However, one court has proffered that where state
courts have yet to decide an issue of state law, a federal court
of appeals can "sit as a state court" and determine how the
state would decide."" The record in this case fails to provide
any guidance as to how New Union's courts would decide the
severability issue. 142
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. See, e.g., Barndollar v. Sunset Realty Corp., 379 So. 2d 1278 (Fla. 1979)
(holding that a severability clause is not determinative of severability, and that to
sever the court must conclude that the legislature would have been content to enact
the act without the invalid provision); Sugarloaf Citizens Assoc. v. Gudis, 573 A.2d
1325 (Md. 1990) (providing that a severability clause is indicative of the intent of the
legislature to sever, and the ultimate test of severability is the intent and what specif-
ically the legislature would have done had they known the statute could only be
partly effective).
140. Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612, 624 (1985) (whether or
not an invalid portion should be severed or statute be rejected as a whole is a matter
of state law); Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964); Old Coach Dev. Corp. v.
Tanzman, 881 F.2d 1227 (3d Cir. 1989).
141. United States v. City of Humboldt, 628 F.2d 549, 551 (9th Cir. 1980).
142. It must be noted at this juncture that several abstention doctrines exist re-
garding situations wherein a federal district court may decline to exercise or postpone
the exercise of jurisdiction on an issue before it which deals with state law. An argu-
ment may be made that severability is a matter of state law and should be decided by
the courts of New Union. The United States Supreme Court has stated that absten-
tion should be exercised in extraordinary circumstances, and that the ultimate test is
whether the order to parties to repair to state court would clearly serve an important
countervailing interest. County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185,
reh'g denied, 361 U.S. 855 (1959).
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B. The Weight and Effect of the General Counsel's
Opinion
In late 1990, the New Union legislature held hearings re-
garding the possible enactment of a statute dealing with the
import and export of hazardous waste. The Chair of the State
Senate's Environmental Protection Committee asked the Gen-
eral Counsel of the State's Department of Environmental Af-
fairs two specific questions as to such legislation. The ques-
tions posed were whether: (1) the legislature could enact bans
on the import and export of hazardous waste; and (2) if the
ban on imports was held invalid by the reviewing court
whether the ban on exports would be struck down as well?
The General Counsel responded affirmatively to both ques-
tions. By February 1991, the legislature had enacted NUHW-
SSA, which contained both a ban on the import and export of
hazardous waste, and which lacked a severability clause.
Both sides in this litigation may attempt to argue that
the involvement of the General Counsel's opinion has an ef-
fect on the statute's interpretation. The weight of such opin-
ion, its role in the legislative history, and the intent of the act
varies based on the context used and case law of the
jurisdiction.
The New Jersey Supreme Court has proffered that
"[w]here the words of the statute are clear and explicit, courts
should not resort to extrinsic material to determine that the
Legislature intended something other than what it actually
expressed. Extrinsic aids are never used to create an ambigu-
ity, only to resolve one."143 In this vein, statements by nonleg-
islative persons in the interpretation and drafting of legisla-
tion are seen as extrinsic aids to interpreting legislative
history. 44 However, the weight courts give such extrinsic
sources varies depending on the facts of case.
Generally, courts will give considerable weight to an exec-
utive department's (agency's) construction of an enabling
143. Gauntt v. City of Bridgeton, 477 A.2d 381, 387 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1984) (citations omitted).
144. See generally ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 114, chapter 7.
1993]
45
804 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10
statute which it is entrusted to administer, on the principle of
deference to administrative interpretations. 14 5 The District of
Columbia Circuit Court held that if reasonable, a court will
give deference to an agency interpretation of its enabling stat-
ute if legislative history is sparse. "" Where agency heads are
involved in the drafting of legislation, their interpretation of
such would be given greater than normal weight.1 4 A number
of courts have dealt with the issue of an Attorney General's
interpretation of a provision, and most have held it to be only
advisory, but often may be persuasive.4 8 When viewed in re-
gards to determining constitutionality of a statute, courts take
conflicting positions regarding the weight of attorney general
[extrinsic source] interpretations. 4 9 However, it must be
noted that these court's decisions reflect an agency/executive
branch interpretation which was provided after the legisla-
tion's enactment.
Regarding extrinsic source legislative materials which
emerged during the hearing and drafting stages of the legisla-
145. Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1983).
See also Howe v. Smith, 452 U.S. 473 (1980) (where the Supreme Court held that
because the Attorney General and Commissioner of the Bureau of Prisons were
charged with the administration of the statute, their views were entitled to great def-
erence); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1 (1964).
146. Alaska Energy Auth. v. FERC, 928 F.2d 1181 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
147. Howe v. Smith, 452 U.S. at 485 (where the Attorney General and Commis-
sioner of the Bureau of Prisons not only drafted legislation but steered it through
Congress); Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 192 (1969) (holding that the impact of an
agency's interpretation carries the most weight when it participated in the drafting
and directly made known its views to Congress in Committee hearings).
148. Hillhouse v. Rice Sch. Dist., 727 P.2d 843 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (attorney
general provisions are only advisory); Higgins v. Director of Revenue, 778 S.W.2d 24
(Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (an attorney general's provision is not binding on the courts or
citizenry, but it may be and often is persuasive); Point Isabel Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Hinojosa, 797 S.W.2d 176 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990) (attorney general opinion is advisory
but entitled to careful consideration).
149. See, e.g., Mulligan v. Joliet Regional Port Dist., 527 N.E.2d 1264 (Ill. 1988)
(a well reasoned opinion of the attorney general is entitled to considerable weight in
resolving a question regarding the constitutionality of a state statute); Cooper v.
Utah, 684 F. Supp. 1060 (D. Utah 1987) (only a court decree, and not an opinion of
an attorney general, can effectively render a legislative enactment unconstitutional).
See also Huntington v. Worthen, 120 U.S. 97 (1886) (stating in dictum that it may
not be wise for subordinate executive or ministerial officers to undertake to pass upon
the constitutionality of legislation prescribing their duties).
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tion's enactment, courts have looked at various factual situa-
tions regarding deference and weight. The Supreme Court has
held that when reports of an agency head or the Attorney
General have not been entered into the public record they
should not be given great weight or deference. 150 The court
asserted this position because the ideas in such reports were
not in the public record and thus should not be given weight
in determining the legislators' intent.15' Likewise, a circuit
court stated that "the advocacy of legislation by an adminis-
trative agency - even the assertion of the need for it to ac-
complish a desired result - is an unsure and unreliable, and
not a highly desirable guide to statutory construction.'
' 52
However, other courts have dealt specifically with the
pre-enactment testimony at legislative hearings, and arrived
at different results. In a 1984 decision, a New Jersey court
held that the testimony of a mayor, who had appeared before
a state senate committee on amending the laws regarding po-
lice chiefs, was not competent to express what was on the col-
lective mind of the legislature.153 A Massachusetts appellate
court arrived at a different conclusion, and held that a
mayor's pre-enactment testimony before the legislature re-
garding an act "shed light on the legislative intent in the en-
actment" of the statute.15 4
In conclusion, the general counsel's responses can play a
very important and vital role in statutory interpretation. The
responses can assist in ascertaining both the legislature's in-
tent and purpose behind the act, and can help to determine if
any constitutional concerns were raised. Finally, this type of
extrinsic evidence may shed light on questions of severability
as well.
150. Kosak v. United States, 465 U.S. 848, 857 n.13 (1983) (dealing with a report
by the legislation's drafter).
151. Id.
152. Advanced Micro Devices v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 742 F.2d 1520, 1542 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (quoting American Trucking v, Atchison, Topeka, & Sante Fe R.R., 387
U.S. 397, 418 (1967).
153. Gauntt v. City of Bridgeton, 477 A.2d 381, 387 n.1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1984).
154. Boston Licensing Bd. v. City of Boston, 455 N.E.2d 469, 473-74 (Mass. App.
Ct. 1983).
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IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
For a brief summary of the arguments refer to page 773.
Jeb Boyt
Deborah A. Primps
Matthew J. Smith
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